jira-ticket-viewer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The scripts/download-attachment.js script reads the Jira CLI configuration file located at ~/.config/.jira/.config.yml to extract user login information.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The download-attachment.js script includes the JIRA_API_TOKEN in the Authorization header when requesting attachment URLs and persists this sensitive header across HTTP redirects, potentially leaking credentials to untrusted third-party servers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution steps in SKILL.md construct shell commands using the OUT_DIR variable inferred from user arguments without explicit sanitization, which could lead to command injection if the directory path contains shell metacharacters.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Jira ticket content (descriptions and comments) which can be used to perform indirect prompt injection attacks against the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted ticket metadata is processed by scripts/parse-ticket.js and scripts/download-attachment.js as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the model to treat the ticket content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute Bash commands, write to the file system, and make network requests via Node.js scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation before the data is processed or summarized.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 14, 2026, 01:31 PM