NYC

Zellij Specialist

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the agent to execute cargo install wasm-pack. Installing packages from crates.io at runtime without specific version pinning can expose the environment to dependency confusion or malicious package versions.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill automates the compilation of Rust source code into WASM binaries using cargo and rustup. Running a compiler on potentially modified or community-sourced code is a form of dynamic execution that could be exploited to execute arbitrary code on the host system.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill's primary workflow involves searching GitHub for community layouts, plugins, and discussions. Ingesting this untrusted content into the LLM context (especially READMEs and KDL comments) creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub search results (READMEs, .kdl files, Issue/PR descriptions).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to delimit external content or ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via cargo, rustup, and write files to the user's configuration directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill extracts patterns directly from community content without validation.
  • Data Exposure (LOW): The skill explicitly targets and checks the directory /home/delorenj/.config/zellij/. While this is functional for the intended purpose, hardcoding specific user home paths can lead to unintended exposure of local system structure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:28 PM