descope-terraform
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-privilege attack surface by ingesting external data to configure authentication infrastructure.
- Ingestion points: The
descope_projectresource ingests authentication flow logic from external JSON files viafile("flows/sign-up-or-in.json")and relies on numerous input variables (var.xxx) for sensitive configurations like connector secrets and redirect URLs. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are present to prevent the agent from adopting malicious configurations found in processed JSON data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for full modification of authentication methods (OTP, Passwords, SSO), RBAC roles/permissions, and management key generation via
terraform apply. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the logic contained within the flow JSON files or the values provided to infrastructure variables.
- Unverifiable Dependencies (MEDIUM): The skill requires the installation of the
descope/descopeTerraform provider. - Evidence:
terraform initdownloads binary provider plugins from the Terraform Registry. Thedescopeorganization is not included in the predefined Trusted External Sources list. - Command Execution (LOW): The skill documentation instructs the user/agent to execute shell commands.
- Evidence:
terraform init,terraform plan, andterraform applyare required for the skill to function. While standard for infrastructure-as-code, these commands execute external binaries with the potential for side effects.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata