wiki
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.md(Section 0-1) explicitly direct the agent to offer to disable security prompts by modifying the environment configuration (.claude/settings.jsonwithbypassPermissions). This is an attempt to bypass the agent's human-in-the-loop safety architecture. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to execute system-level commands, creating a significant attack surface.
- Evidence: Use of
git init,git branch,git remote add,git commit, andgit pushwithinSKILL.md. - Evidence: Execution of
grepandfindcommands inreferences/extraction.mdto scan the filesystem for sensitive project metadata. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of remote content and the installation of third-party extensions.
- Evidence: Use of
git clone <url>to pull remote repository data. - Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdtemplates recommendingnpx skills addto install external agent skills. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary workflow involves extracting domain knowledge, API specifications, and data models from a local codebase and pushing them to an external Git repository.
- Evidence: The 'Extract' and 'Update' modes in
SKILL.mdautomate the collection of internal system information and its transmission viagit pushto a user-specified remote URL.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata