wiki-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the user or agent to modify the AI agent's internal configuration (.claude/settings.json) to set defaultMode to bypassPermissions. This is a deliberate attempt to suppress safety and permission prompts, allowing the agent to execute commands without human oversight.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read through project source code and push extracted information to a remote Git repository. If an attacker provides a malicious remote URL, the agent could be used to exfiltrate proprietary source code, business logic, or sensitive configuration files found during the 'Extract' phase.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses complex shell commands involving git, grep, and find to analyze and manage files. There is a risk of command injection if the project structure contains maliciously named files or directories designed to break shell syntax.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from source code files to generate documentation and the new skill's instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Project files such as schema.prisma, package.json, and source code (.ts, .java, .go) are scanned for domain information.
  • Boundary markers: Uses HTML comments like <!-- extracted from: ... --> to mark sections, which provide weak isolation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses Bash, Write, and Edit capabilities, along with git access for remote synchronization.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the content extracted from the source files before it is written into the new wiki's SKILL.md or markdown files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 04:29 PM