gitops-master

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture relies on a user-configurable ssh_command variable (e.g., in .gitops-config.yaml) that is prepended to many diagnostic and promotion commands. This pattern allows for arbitrary command injection if the configuration source is untrusted or maliciously modified.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In the 'Phase S3: Adding Verification' section, the skill provides templates for Kubernetes AnalysisTemplate resources that execute multi-line bash scripts inside alpine/k8s containers. This encourages the execution of arbitrary, potentially unsanitized code within the cluster environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating data from external sources into shell commands without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Configuration from .gitops-config.yaml and live output from various kubectl commands.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in shell interpolation logic.
  • Capability inventory: Significant capabilities including kubectl access, ssh command execution, and the ability to create/modify Kubernetes resources like Secrets and ClusterRoles.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of shell escaping or input validation for variables used in command strings.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for creating high-privilege ClusterRole and ClusterRoleBinding resources. While necessary for its function, this provides a mechanism for privilege escalation within the cluster if used incorrectly.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational flow includes reading sensitive resources such as Kubernetes secrets and configmaps as part of its verification and diagnostic processes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 02:48 PM