git-worktree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts that perform destructive file system operations. The scripts
scripts/cleanup-worktree.shandscripts/convert-to-bare.shutilizerm -rfto delete directories during repository cleanup and structure conversion. Additionally,scripts/open-in-tmux.shuses a shell heredoc (<<EOF) that allows for shell variable expansion and command substitution of the user-provided context. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates interaction with remote repositories. It uses
git cloneinscripts/bare-clone.shand GitHub CLI commands such asgh pr viewandgh pr checkoutinscripts/create-worktree.shto fetch external content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface and potential command injection risk. Ingestion points: User input for feature names, descriptions, and task notes are collected via the agent. Boundary markers: The skill writes this untrusted data to
CLAUDE.local.mdwithout using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files, execute scripts, and run git/tmux commands. Sanitization: The bash snippets inSKILL.mdinterpolate user-provided strings (like{description}) directly into double-quoted shell command arguments without escaping metacharacters like backticks or dollar signs, which could lead to command execution during the agent's workflow.
Audit Metadata