github
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Data Exposure] (HIGH): The skill explicitly includes commands to access and upload sensitive local files. Specifically,
gh ssh-key add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pubtargets the SSH directory, andgh secret set MY_SECRET < secret.txtencourages the transmission of local secrets to GitHub. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses an extensive attack surface for indirect injection. It ingests untrusted data from external sources and has high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion Points:
gh issue list,gh pr view,gh search,gh api, and particularlygh run view --log(reading CI/CD output). - Boundary Markers: None present. The agent processes raw output from GitHub which may contain malicious instructions embedded by external contributors in PRs or issues.
- Capability Inventory: High. The skill can merge PRs (
gh pr merge), set repository secrets (gh secret set), and execute arbitrary API calls (gh api). - Sanitization: None. The skill provides no mechanisms to filter or escape instructions found within the data it reads.
- [External Downloads / Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The command
gh extension install owner/gh-extensionallows the installation of third-party extensions from any GitHub repository. These extensions run with the user's permissions and can execute arbitrary code. - [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill is entirely based on executing shell commands. While expected for a CLI wrapper, it provides an agent with the ability to perform significant modifications to a user's GitHub environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata