NYC

github

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Data Exposure] (HIGH): The skill explicitly includes commands to access and upload sensitive local files. Specifically, gh ssh-key add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub targets the SSH directory, and gh secret set MY_SECRET < secret.txt encourages the transmission of local secrets to GitHub.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses an extensive attack surface for indirect injection. It ingests untrusted data from external sources and has high-privilege capabilities.
  • Ingestion Points: gh issue list, gh pr view, gh search, gh api, and particularly gh run view --log (reading CI/CD output).
  • Boundary Markers: None present. The agent processes raw output from GitHub which may contain malicious instructions embedded by external contributors in PRs or issues.
  • Capability Inventory: High. The skill can merge PRs (gh pr merge), set repository secrets (gh secret set), and execute arbitrary API calls (gh api).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill provides no mechanisms to filter or escape instructions found within the data it reads.
  • [External Downloads / Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The command gh extension install owner/gh-extension allows the installation of third-party extensions from any GitHub repository. These extensions run with the user's permissions and can execute arbitrary code.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill is entirely based on executing shell commands. While expected for a CLI wrapper, it provides an agent with the ability to perform significant modifications to a user's GitHub environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 10:56 PM