active-directory-attacks

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt’s examples and workflow repeatedly embed plaintext credentials, hashes, and passwords directly into commands (e.g., user:password, -p 'password', domain/admin:pass@host, NTHASH), which would force an LLM to accept and output secret values verbatim.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

  • Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The document is an explicit offensive playbook describing credential theft (Mimikatz, DCSync, Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting), ticket forging (Golden/Silver tickets, Pass‑the‑Hash/OverPass), remote code execution and lateral movement (psexec, wmiexec, ntlmrelayx, exploits like ZeroLogon/PrintNightmare), and persistence techniques — all clear, intentional malicious behaviors for compromising Active Directory environments.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill instructs privileged, state-changing actions (e.g., "sudo date -s" to change system time) and guides using tools and exploits that alter system/domain state and require elevated/sudo privileges, so it pushes the agent to modify the host/target state.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 08:26 AM