openrouter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Dynamic Execution (LOW): The
templates/tool-calling.tsfile utilizesmathjs.evaluate()to implement a calculation tool. This involves the dynamic evaluation of strings provided by the LLM. Whilemathjsis more restricted than a full JavaScripteval(), it represents a dynamic execution surface that could be targeted if the agent is subverted. The severity is lowered as this is a standard educational example for tool-calling patterns.\n- Persistence Mechanisms (LOW): TheQUICKSTART.mddocumentation provides instructions for users to persist their API key by appending an export command to their~/.bashrcfile. This practice stores sensitive credentials in a plain-text configuration file accessible to any local process, which is a suboptimal security practice common in tutorials.\n- Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The templates are designed to ingest untrusted user input and forward it to external API endpoints without sanitization.\n - Ingestion points: The
userMessageparameter inbasic-request.ts,streaming-request.ts, andtool-calling.tsacts as the entry point for untrusted data.\n - Boundary markers: None are implemented in the templates.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network requests (
fetch) and expression evaluation (mathjs).\n - Sanitization: None; the templates rely on the developer to implement appropriate validation for production use.
Audit Metadata