nav-marker

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): Category 8 (Indirect Prompt Injection). The skill ingests untrusted conversation history to generate context 'markers'. Evidence: Ingestion point found in functions/marker_compressor.py and SKILL.md Step 3. Boundary markers are entirely absent, and there is no sanitization of the captured conversation content. The skill possesses Write and Bash capabilities, which could be leveraged if malicious instructions embedded in the conversation are persisted into a marker and later interpreted as commands during restoration.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes the Bash tool for environment setup and integrity verification. Evidence: SKILL.md (Step 1, Step 4.5) uses shell commands for mkdir and md5sum. While the current commands are relatively safe, the pattern of executing shell scripts alongside untrusted data ingestion increases the overall attack surface.
  • METADATA_POISONING (LOW): There is an inconsistency between the skill metadata in SKILL.md (which references create_marker.py) and the actual provided script functions/marker_compressor.py.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:29 PM