nav-skill-creator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The file
functions/skill_generator.pyis vulnerable to injection attacks because it uses raw f-strings to construct skill files from untrusted user input. - Ingestion points: The
descriptionandtriggersparameters in thegenerate_skill_structurefunction are directly interpolated into the file content. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or escaping mechanisms to prevent user input from breaking out of YAML frontmatter or Markdown body fields.
- Capability inventory: Resulting skills are granted high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andEditby default. - Sanitization: Validation only exists for the
skill_namefield (via regex); thedescriptionandtriggersinputs are inserted raw, allowing an attacker to inject YAML delimiters (---) and override tool permissions or instructions. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The
example-feature-generator.mdskill and the generator's default tool list includeBash,Write, andEdit. These tools allow the agent to execute shell commands and modify the filesystem. In the context of the injection vulnerability, this provides a direct path for executing arbitrary code or persisting malicious scripts. - [Metadata Poisoning] (LOW): The generation process allows users to specify unvalidated descriptions and version numbers, which can be used to disguise the purpose of a generated skill or impersonate legitimate tools.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata