using-git-worktrees

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill automatically runs installation and build commands (npm install, pip install, poetry install, cargo build) inside a new worktree. Malicious repositories can exploit this by defining arbitrary code in pre-install hooks or setup scripts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill executes test suites (npm test, cargo test, pytest, go test) automatically. If the repository is untrusted, this provides an immediate vector for executing malicious code under the guise of a baseline test check.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill has a high-risk attack surface as it ingests untrusted data from files like CLAUDE.md, package.json, and requirements.txt to determine its behavior and setup steps. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: CLAUDE.md, package.json, Cargo.toml. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capabilities: Arbitrary command execution and file modification (.gitignore). 4. Sanitization: Absent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill triggers automated downloads from external registries (npm, PyPI, Cargo) without verifying the contents or asking for user confirmation of the dependency tree.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Shell commands are constructed using environment-derived variables like $BRANCH_NAME. Although variables are quoted, there is a risk of injection if the agent is manipulated into using malicious branch names or project paths.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:14 PM