git-ci
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands via
gh(GitHub CLI) andglab(GitLab CI CLI) to retrieve pipeline status, logs, and pull request metadata. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Provides recipes to list CI/CD secrets and variables which may contain sensitive environment data.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/ci-queries.mdincludegh variable list,gh secret list, andglab variable list. - Evidence: The skill documentation in
references/allowlist.mdexplicitly notes thatglab variable listexposes CI/CD variable values such as API keys and passwords. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing external data from CI/CD logs and pull request metadata.
- Ingestion points: Command outputs from
gh run view --log,gh pr view, andglab ci trace(files:SKILL.md,references/ci-queries.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; command outputs are processed without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content.
- Capability inventory: Executes shell commands (
gh,glab,jq) which could be influenced by malicious content in logs or PR fields. - Sanitization: Absent; output is directly presented to the agent or piped to other utilities.
Audit Metadata