browser-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill creates a significant attack surface by reading untrusted external web content and providing powerful interaction tools. • Ingestion points: The
read_page,get_page_text, andfindtools ingest raw or structured data from the browser's DOM and accessibility tree (as documented inreferences/claude-in-chrome-mcp.md). • Boundary markers: The provided execution patterns and sequential-thinking templates (e.g.,resources/sequential-thinking-patterns.md) do not include delimiters or instructions to treat ingested webpage content as untrusted. • Capability inventory: The skill includes high-privilege interaction tools such asnavigate,form_input, andcomputer(mouse/keyboard control) that can be used to execute state-changing operations on the user's behalf. • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved fromread_pagebefore it is processed by the agent's reasoning engine. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The
computertool allows the agent to simulate keyboard and mouse events (references/claude-in-chrome-mcp.md). While restricted to the browser context, this could be exploited by an attacker-controlled webpage to trick the agent into clicking sensitive UI elements or inputting data into fields it shouldn't access.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata