project-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [Prompt Injection / Indirect Injection] (HIGH): The
/wrap-sessionand/reflectcommands analyze untrusted conversation history to automatically generate and save project rules in.claude/rules/. An attacker can inject instructions into the conversation that trick the agent into creating rules that persistently override its future safety constraints or operational logic. This lacks any sanitization or boundary markers for the ingested content. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill relies extensively on shell command execution via the
gitCLI (add, commit, push, log) and system utilities likemkdir. Incommands/wrap-session.md, it constructs complex multi-line shell commands for git commits using heredocs. - [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The
/releaseworkflow requires external toolsgitleaksandnpm auditto be present in the execution environment. While these are common security tools, the skill invokes them as unverified dependencies. - [Data Exfiltration] (LOW): The
/wrap-sessioncommand initiatesgit pushoperations, which transmit repository content to remote servers. This constitutes a network-based data transfer that, while functional, is a point of exposure.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata