anki-connect
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's primary function involves processing data that may originate from untrusted external sources (shared decks or media) while the agent maintains significant capabilities to modify the environment.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
findNotes,notesInfo,findCards, andcardsInfoto read arbitrary card and note content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to help the agent distinguish between its own system instructions and the content retrieved from the Anki database.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to execute shell commands (
curl,jq), perform file-system-impacting modifications (adding/deleting/updating notes), and fetch external data via thestoreMediaFileURL parameter. - Sanitization: While the skill recommends
jq --argfor structural JSON integrity, this does not sanitize the semantic content of the data, leaving the agent vulnerable to instructions embedded within note fields. - Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on direct execution of shell commands for all operations.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides multiple templates for executingcurlandjqpipelines. While these are standard tools, their use increases the impact of any successful prompt injection. - Data Exposure & Exfiltration (LOW): The skill is designed to read potentially sensitive personal data from a local database.
- Evidence: The
notesInfoandretrieveMediaFileactions provide access to the user's entire Anki collection. Although the skill primarily communicates with127.0.0.1, thestoreMediaFileaction'surlparameter allows for arbitrary outbound GET requests which could be abused for exfiltration if the agent is compromised.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata