gpt-image-1-5
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The script
scripts/generate_image.pyaccepts an OpenAI API key through a command-line argument (--api-key). This practice is insecure as command-line arguments are visible to other users on the system via process monitoring tools likepsand are often saved in shell history files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The script performs network operations to the OpenAI API, which is not on the explicit whitelist of trusted exfiltration-check domains. Additionally, it allows arbitrary file writing via the
--filenameparameter. The script usesPath(args.filename).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)without validating that the path remains within the user's intended workspace, which could permit path traversal if the filename is manipulated (e.g.,../../target_file). - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) by interpolating untrusted user input into API prompts.
- Ingestion points: User instructions are ingested via the
--promptargument inscripts/generate_image.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The user-provided prompt is passed directly to the model without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests to external APIs and write files to the local file system.
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic to sanitize the prompt or validate the output filename against directory traversal patterns.
Audit Metadata