cook-hard
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its high-privilege capabilities combined with untrusted data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts arbitrary input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdwithin the<tasks>tags. - Boundary markers: XML-style tags (
<tasks>) are used to delimit input, which provides some structure but is insufficient to prevent an attacker from escaping the context or overriding instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill workflow includes file modification (implementation phase and documentation updates) and command execution (
type-check,compile, andRun relevant testsinSKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the content provided in
$ARGUMENTSbefore it is used to drive the agent's actions. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill specifically instructs the agent to execute compiler and test suite commands. While these are functional requirements for a development skill, they provide an execution vector for any malicious code injected through the tasks argument.
- [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill references internal configuration files located in
.claude/skills/shared/. While this is part of its operational logic, it exposes the path structure and content of internal agent protocols to the processing context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata