NYC

cook-hard

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its high-privilege capabilities combined with untrusted data ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: The skill accepts arbitrary input via the $ARGUMENTS variable in SKILL.md within the <tasks> tags.
  • Boundary markers: XML-style tags (<tasks>) are used to delimit input, which provides some structure but is insufficient to prevent an attacker from escaping the context or overriding instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill workflow includes file modification (implementation phase and documentation updates) and command execution (type-check, compile, and Run relevant tests in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the content provided in $ARGUMENTS before it is used to drive the agent's actions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill specifically instructs the agent to execute compiler and test suite commands. While these are functional requirements for a development skill, they provide an execution vector for any malicious code injected through the tasks argument.
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill references internal configuration files located in .claude/skills/shared/. While this is part of its operational logic, it exposes the path structure and content of internal agent protocols to the processing context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:58 PM