design-fast
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill accepts untrusted data via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable, which is then processed by the agent to fulfill design tasks. This data is used to populate parameters for shell commands and determines content written to the local filesystem. - Ingestion Point: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable within the<tasks>tags inSKILL.md. - Boundary Markers: Uses
<tasks>XML-style delimiters, but lacks instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the user data. - Capability Inventory: The skill performs shell execution (running
search.pyviapython3) and file modification (updating./docs/design-guidelines.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input is performed before it influences downstream actions.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The workflow explicitly directs the agent to execute Python scripts located in the
$HOMEdirectory. While these scripts are part of the broader skill ecosystem, executing shell commands based on templates that are filled using untrusted user input (e.g.,<product-type>,<style-keywords>) poses a risk of argument injection if the agent does not properly escape the inputs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata