design-screenshot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted multimodal data and has write/execute capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-provided screenshots via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded text within the screenshot analysis workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill can create directories, write markdown files (
plan.md,phase-XX-phase-name.md), generate HTML/CSS/JS code, and modify existing documentation (./docs/design-guidelines.md). - Sanitization: There is no sanitization of the text extracted from the screenshot before it is passed to the planning and implementation subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The workflow (Step 4) generates and implements code in pure HTML/CSS/JS based on plans derived from untrusted input. An attacker could use a screenshot to influence the generated code to include malicious scripts (e.g., cross-site scripting or local file access if viewed in a vulnerable environment).
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill lists
ui-ux-pro-maxandfrontend-designas required skills that must be 'activated'. These are unverifiable dependencies that are not provided in the source and do not originate from a documented trusted source.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata