fix-hard
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data through the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder within<issues>tags. This input drives the behavior of multiple subagents capable of writing code and managing repositories. - Ingestion points: File
SKILL.mdvia<issues>$ARGUMENTS</issues>. - Boundary markers: Uses XML-style
<issues>tags, but lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within that data. - Capability inventory: Includes code implementation (
/codecommand), repository modification (git-manager), and internet research (researcher). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input data is present.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly utilizes the
/codecommand and subagents likedebuggerto perform actions on the local environment. When combined with untrusted input, this increases the risk of arbitrary code execution through the planner-to-code pipeline. - [External Downloads] (LOW): The
researchersubagent is instructed to perform internet searches, which introduces external content into the reasoning chain, potentially leading to multi-step injection attacks.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata