scout-ext

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute external CLI utilities (gemini and opencode). The command construction pattern interpolates a [prompt] variable directly into the shell string (e.g., gemini -p "[prompt]"). This is a classic injection vector where shell metacharacters in the prompt could be used to execute unintended commands.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the agent to check for the presence of external tools and prompt the user for installation if they are missing. While gemini is a well-known service, opencode (referenced with the opencode/grok-code model) is an unverified dependency that the agent is encouraged to fetch and install.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By combining dynamic command construction with shell execution, the skill creates a surface for remote code execution. An attacker could provide a malicious prompt or create a file with a name that, when processed, executes arbitrary code on the host machine.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by reading untrusted data from the filesystem during the scouting process.
  • Ingestion points: The skill crawls directories and reads file paths to identify relevant files for tasks.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specified delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within the files being scouted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill leverages the Bash tool for command execution and the Task tool for sub-agent orchestration.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the workflow does not include steps to sanitize or validate the content of the files or directory names before they influence subsequent agent actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 07:59 PM