skills/duvesalo/app/resend/Gen Agent Trust Hub

resend

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent-email-inbox sub-skill is specifically designed to facilitate the processing of untrusted email content by AI agents, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Incoming email.received webhook events and the resend.emails.receiving.get() API call used to retrieve full email bodies (documented in agent-email-inbox/SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation recommends several "Security Levels" (Allowlists, Content Filtering, Sandboxing) to isolate untrusted input, though enforcement is dependent on user implementation.
  • Capability inventory: The documentation notes that agents may be configured with dangerous capabilities such as execute, delete, or forward which could be exploited via malicious email instructions.
  • Sanitization: The skill provides practical guidance and regex examples for stripping HTML content and removing quoted email threads to reduce the attack surface.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A reference implementation for a sender allowlist in agent-email-inbox/SKILL.md uses substring matching (.includes()), which is susceptible to bypass via specially crafted domains (e.g., admin@company.com.evil.com). This vulnerability is acknowledged and addressed within the skill's own testing scenarios.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of official Resend SDKs from well-known package registries (NPM, PyPI, etc.) and the use of the svix package for webhook verification. These are standard dependencies for the Resend service and are considered safe sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 2, 2026, 12:34 PM