improve-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/extract-session.jsaccesses sensitive directories containing private user conversation history. Specifically, it targets: ~/.claude/projects/(Claude Code sessions)~/.pi/agent/sessions/(Pi sessions)~/.codex/sessions/(Codex sessions)- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Node.js script that uses the
fsmodule to perform directory traversal and read the contents of hidden application metadata folders in the user's home directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill presents a significant indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data (session transcripts) and using it to generate executable instructions or documentation that is written back to the filesystem.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/extract-session.jsreads.jsonlsession files from local app data folders. - Boundary markers: None. The prompt templates in
SKILL.mddo not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the transcript. - Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to write files to disk, specifically
SKILL.mdfiles within~/.codex/skills/,~/.claude/skills/, and~/.pi/agent/skills/. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the transcript content before it is used to influence the writing of new skill files.
Audit Metadata