agent-browser

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill's core purpose is to ingest and act upon untrusted web content. This creates a significant attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: agent-browser snapshot and agent-browser get commands ingest data from arbitrary URLs.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions to the agent to distinguish between tool-provided instructions and web content.
  • Capability inventory: High-impact capabilities include click, fill, screenshot, pdf, and select, which allow for state-changing actions and data capture.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the web content is performed before it is presented to the agent's context.
  • [External Downloads] (LOW): The skill requires installing agent-browser via npm and downloading the Chromium browser. Per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], this is downgraded to LOW as it originates from a trusted organization (Vercel), but still represents the execution of external binaries.
  • [Data Exfiltration / Exposure] (MEDIUM): The tool can be used to navigate to internal network services (SSRF) or local file systems (via file://). The agent can then exfiltrate this data using screenshot to save files locally or get text to read contents into its memory.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on shell command execution. If URLs or input strings are not properly sanitized by the underlying agent before being passed to the agent-browser CLI, it could lead to command injection on the host system.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:15 AM