skills/eigent-ai/eigent/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py contains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled into a shared object (lo_socket_shim.so) at runtime using gcc.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses LD_PRELOAD to inject the dynamically compiled C library into the soffice process. This technique is used to bypass system-level restrictions on AF_UNIX sockets in restricted or sandboxed environments, which constitutes a deliberate escalation of process capabilities beyond environment defaults.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several subprocess calls to manage document processing, including gcc for compilation, soffice for PDF conversion, and pdftoppm for image extraction.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: User-provided .pptx files are ingested into the agent context via the markitdown library as specified in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the extracted presentation text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including subprocess execution (gcc, soffice, pdftoppm) and file system write access (pack.py, add_slide.py).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is present for the text extracted from slide decks.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill exhibits conflicting metadata; while the YAML frontmatter claims authorship by eigent-ai and a proprietary license, the LICENSE.txt file contains an Anthropic copyright and standard license terms, which may lead to confusion regarding the provenance and safety of the code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 09:50 AM