skills/eigent-ai/eigent/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime code generation, compilation, and injection.
  • The script scripts/office/soffice.py contains an embedded C source code string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled using gcc at runtime.
  • The resulting shared library is then loaded into the soffice process using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to intercept system calls.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes arbitrary commands and performs unsafe file operations.
  • The script scripts/recalc.py injects a LibreOffice Basic macro into the user's application configuration directory (~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/basic/Standard/Module1.xba or macOS equivalent) to automate formula recalculation.
  • The unpack function in scripts/office/unpack.py uses zipfile.ZipFile.extractall() on user-provided Office documents without path sanitization, creating a ZipSlip vulnerability that allows for path traversal and arbitrary file write.
  • Multiple scripts use subprocess.run to execute external binaries including soffice, gcc, and git across various modules (scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant surface area for indirect prompt injection.
  • The agent is instructed to process external spreadsheets and documents which enter the context through scripts/recalc.py and scripts/office/unpack.py.
  • There are no boundary markers or explicit safety instructions to prevent the agent from obeying malicious prompts embedded within these user-provided files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 09:50 AM