rubocop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process external, untrusted content (Ruby source code). It possesses significant capabilities, including file modification through autocorrect and execution of subprocesses, which creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Ruby source files across the project directory (e.g.,
app/,lib/,spec/). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specified delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded prompts in the analyzed code.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
rubocop), file system modification (rubocop -a/-A), and git interaction. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any sanitization or validation of the code content before analysis or autocorrection.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill frequently uses shell commands to invoke RuboCop. Complex shell patterns like
git diff ... | xargs rubocopare recommended, which could be exploited for command injection if file names are maliciously crafted in the project environment. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): As documented in
custom_cops_guide.md, RuboCop can dynamically load and execute Ruby code via therequiredirective in.rubocop.yml. If an attacker can modify the project's configuration, they can achieve arbitrary code execution in the agent's environment. - External Downloads (LOW): The
extensions_guide.mdrecommends installing external gems viagem installorGemfile. While these are trusted sources (RubyGems), runtime installation of dependencies is a risk factor that should be managed via strict environment controls.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata