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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes data from external subagents without appropriate safeguards.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests
files_modifiedlists andstory titlestrings fromRALPH_DONEsignals provided by other agents. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions telling the agent to treat the
RALPH_DONEdata as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within those fields. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to run
git diff,git add, andgit commitcommands. - Sanitization: There is no requirement or logic to sanitize or escape the inputs before they are used in shell command templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands using untrusted data from external signals.
- In Step 4, the instructions mandate building a
git addcommand using thefiles_modifiedlist and agit commitcommand using thestory titleprovided in theRALPH_DONEsignal. If these inputs contain shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipes), they could potentially be exploited to execute arbitrary commands depending on how the agent's execution environment handles shell escaping.
Audit Metadata