openai-whisper-api
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Argument Injection in
scripts/transcribe.sh. The shell script expands optional flags (--languageand--prompt) without proper quoting for the expansion itself. Evidence: Line 77 and 78 inscripts/transcribe.shuse${language:+-F "language=${language}"}. Because the expansion is not outer-quoted, a crafted input for these parameters can perform word splitting and inject additional arguments into thecurlcommand. An attacker could inject flags like-oto overwrite arbitrary system files or--data-binaryto read them. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (HIGH): Arbitrary File Read and Transmission. Using the argument injection described above, an attacker could inject
curlflags such as-F "file=@/etc/passwd"to exfiltrate sensitive local files to the OpenAI API or redirect thecurloutput to an attacker-controlled endpoint by injecting a secondary URL. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes external audio files and user-provided prompt strings that are then sent to a third-party LLM (Whisper).
- Ingestion points:
scripts/transcribe.shaccepts a file path as a positional argument and a--promptstring. - Boundary markers: Absent; the script acts as a pass-through.
- Capability inventory: The script has network access via
curland file-system write access via shell redirection. - Sanitization: Absent; input is not validated before being passed to the shell environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata