openai-whisper-api

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): Argument Injection in scripts/transcribe.sh. The shell script expands optional flags (--language and --prompt) without proper quoting for the expansion itself. Evidence: Line 77 and 78 in scripts/transcribe.sh use ${language:+-F "language=${language}"}. Because the expansion is not outer-quoted, a crafted input for these parameters can perform word splitting and inject additional arguments into the curl command. An attacker could inject flags like -o to overwrite arbitrary system files or --data-binary to read them.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (HIGH): Arbitrary File Read and Transmission. Using the argument injection described above, an attacker could inject curl flags such as -F "file=@/etc/passwd" to exfiltrate sensitive local files to the OpenAI API or redirect the curl output to an attacker-controlled endpoint by injecting a secondary URL.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes external audio files and user-provided prompt strings that are then sent to a third-party LLM (Whisper).
  • Ingestion points: scripts/transcribe.sh accepts a file path as a positional argument and a --prompt string.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the script acts as a pass-through.
  • Capability inventory: The script has network access via curl and file-system write access via shell redirection.
  • Sanitization: Absent; input is not validated before being passed to the shell environment.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 18, 2026, 06:11 PM