dont-be-greedy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's primary purpose is to ingest untrusted data from external files (CSV, JSON, LOG, etc.) and present previews or summaries to the agent. This creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion Points:
scripts/quick_inspect.py(lines 14, 31, 48) andscripts/summarize.py(line 21) read and process external file content. - Boundary Markers: None. The instructions in
SKILL.mddo not require the agent to wrap external content in delimiters or include 'ignore instructions' warnings. - Capability Inventory: The skill has access to the
bashtool with permissions forpython,cat, and other utilities, allowing it to perform side effects based on agent reasoning. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the file content before it is summarized and returned to the agent's context.
- Command Execution (HIGH): The instructions in
SKILL.md(Steps 1 and 3) recommend executing bash commands by interpolating a file path into a string:python scripts/estimate_size.py "<file_path>". If the<file_path>provided by a user contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; python -c '...' ; "), it could lead to arbitrary command execution within the bash tool environment, especially if the agent does not strictly sanitize the input variable. - Metadata Poisoning (LOW): The skill includes instructions like 'Return a safe preview and summary without asking the user what to do' and 'Act immediately'. While intended for automation, these instructions encourage the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop checks when handling potentially malicious external data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata