software-tool-research
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's core functionality involves ingesting and processing untrusted data from external software repositories, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflows 1, 2, 4, 5) instructs the agent to useread_file,grep_search, andsemantic_searchto consume content from repository files, including READMEs and source code. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide 'ignore instructions' warnings when processing this untrusted content, allowing embedded malicious prompts to potentially hijack the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses file system access and search tools. A malicious repository could use documentation to trick the agent into mischaracterizing the software or attempting unauthorized file access.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation logic for the external data being processed.
- Data Exposure (LOW): As part of its 'Security Focus', the skill encourages the agent to search for hardcoded secrets and sensitive configuration files like
.envor credentials. While this is a functional feature for a research tool, it involves handling sensitive data which could be exposed if the agent's output is not properly restricted.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata