sec-edgar-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill provides tools to read raw content from SEC filings via functions like
filing.text()andfiling.markdown()inreference/objects.mdandSKILL.md. This content is externally controlled and can be manipulated by an attacker to include hidden instructions. In a high-privilege environment such as Claude Code, which can execute system commands, these instructions could lead to arbitrary code execution or data theft. \n - Ingestion Points:
filing.text(),filing.markdown(),filing.search(), andfiling.items()acrossSKILL.mdandreference/objects.md. \n - Boundary Markers: None. No instructions are provided to the agent to sanitize or ignore embedded instructions in the filing data. \n
- Capability Inventory: The skill is specifically designed for agents with command-line access and general-purpose tool execution. \n
- Sanitization: Absent. Data is passed directly to the agent's context. \n- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill requires the installation of the
edgartoolslibrary as seen inrequirements.txt. This library is not hosted in a pre-approved 'Trusted Source' repository, making its installation a medium-risk dependency management issue per policy.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata