The Agent Skills Directory

Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill uses the $ARGUMENTS placeholder directly within an <instructions> block. A malicious user or an upstream tool providing these arguments could include commands that bypass the intended logic or safety filters.
Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH):
Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from two primary sources: the $ARGUMENTS variable and the local codebase via the Task tool with subagent_type=Explore.
Boundary markers: The skill uses minimal delimiters (<instructions>) for user arguments, which are easily escapable. No boundary markers are defined for the content extracted from the codebase during Phase 1.
Capability inventory: The skill is granted the Write tool (enabling filesystem modification) and the Task tool (enabling the spawning of further subagents).
Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present to filter malicious instructions embedded within the codebase files or user arguments.
Evidence: Phase 1 performs a 'deep-dive on the codebase' and Phase 3 uses the Write tool. If a file in the explored codebase contains a hidden instruction (e.g., in a comment), it could influence the agent to write a backdoor or exfiltrate data during the specification phase.

interview