custom-index-eval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes data from local files as instructions for its internal logic and sub-agents.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads domain evaluation patterns and judgement instructions from files in the
eval/index/directory (e.g.,SKILL.mdStep 1 and 2).\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers (
##) and bullet points (- must,- should) to parse data, but it lacks clear delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore potentially embedded directives within that data when passing it to thequery-judgesub-agent.\n - Capability inventory: The skill can read local files and invoke the
mcp_fusion_searchormcp_fusion_search_frameworktools based on the content of the parsed files.\n - Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or sanitization of the input file content is performed before it is used to build prompts or search queries.
Audit Metadata