character-profile
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdand the test scripttest/test_enhancement.pyexplicitly demonstrate the execution of local Python scripts within thescripts/directory to manage files and run workflows. While these scripts are part of the skill, they represent a broad capability surface for interacting with the host filesystem. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The configuration file
config/validation_rules.jsoncontains Python-like expressions inconditionfields, such asage.isdigit() and not (0 <= int(age) <= 150). This strongly suggests that theConflictDetectoragent utilizeseval()or a similar function to execute these strings at runtime against character data. If inputs likenameorageare maliciously crafted by a user or ingested from a malicious file, it could lead to arbitrary code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection due to its file-scanning features.
- Ingestion points: The
LoreBibleManager(referenced inSKILL.md) scans and parses existing markdown files within the02_LoreBible/Characters/directory to build an index. - Boundary markers: The system lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the scanned character profiles.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system write access (
shutil.move), directory creation, and the ability to execute subprocesses to run other scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence in the provided configuration or documentation of input validation or sanitization for data ingested from existing files before it influences agent behavior or conflict detection results.
Audit Metadata