ce-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several local scripts (
packs-resolve.py,peer-job-runner.py,light-webserver.js) to execute system commands likegitandps. These scripts use array-based argument passing to avoid shell injection and incorporate extensive security checks, such as ownership verification (os.fstaton POSIX and SID validation on Windows) and directory traversal prevention via realpath containment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes opt-in components for Slack research and 'Model Elevation.' The elevation process uses the Claude CLI to perform reasoning-heavy tasks. This process is strictly governed by a 'read-only' posture that limits the remote model's tools to repo-reading (
Read,Glob,Grep) and web-searching (WebSearch,WebFetch), explicitly excluding write or shell access. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
peer-job-runner.pyscript manages the lifecycle of detached peer jobs, including double-forking on POSIX andDETACHED_PROCESScreation on Windows. Additionally,light-webserver.jsstarts a local Node.js server to serve visual probes. Both systems use private scratch directories in/tmp(or%LOCALAPPDATA%) and enforce strict security boundaries, including the use ofO_NOFOLLOWand atomic file operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest external data from Slack messages and repository files. To mitigate injection risks, the instructions include an 'Adversarial Reasoning Framework' and explicit directives (
references/agents/slack-researcher.mdandreferences/reasoning-elevation.md) to treat all external inputs as untrusted data to be interpreted rather than instructions to be followed.
Audit Metadata