ce-proof

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local markdown files and uploads their contents to https://www.proofeditor.ai for sharing. This transmits local data to an external service that is not part of the standard whitelisted domains.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to orchestrate complex sequences of curl requests, jq data processing, and local file system operations like mv and mktemp.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's human-in-the-loop review mode in references/hitl-review.md creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. Specifically, Phase 2.3 instructs the agent to treat 'imperatives' found in user-authored comments (marks) as actionable commands to be executed directly, such as 'rename X to Y' or 'remove this'.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from the /api/agent/{slug}/state endpoint in references/hitl-review.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no markers or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between data and instructions within the comments.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the local file system (Write) and execute shell commands (Bash), which can be triggered by these external comments.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the feedback ingested from the external service before the agent acts upon it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 24, 2026, 05:56 PM