ce-worktree
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/worktree-manager.shexecutes numerous system commands (includinggit worktree,git checkout,git pull,mkdir, andcp) using arguments provided by the AI agent or user. While variables are double-quoted to prevent word splitting, the lack of character validation on branch names or path components could lead to unexpected command behavior or flag injection. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a feature to automatically grant trust to developer tool configurations (
miseanddirenv) via thetrust_dev_toolsfunction. These tools are designed to execute code when entering a directory and include mandatory manual 'allow' steps to prevent malicious code execution. By programmatically runningmise trustanddirenv allow, the skill bypasses this human-in-the-loop security model. Although the script attempts to verify that configuration files match a 'trusted' baseline branch (likemainordevelop), this assumes the integrity of the remote branch and the local git database. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
create_worktreefunction performs agit pull origin "$from_branch"operation. This connects to the remote repository associated with the current project to fetch the latest changes during worktree creation. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script automatically identifies and copies all environment files (matching
.env*, excluding.env.example) from the main repository to the new worktree path. While the data remains on the local filesystem, this behavior facilitates the proliferation of sensitive secrets across multiple directories.
Audit Metadata