skill-manager

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. It is designed to ingest and store data (logs and configurations) from external/untrusted skills and specifically instructs the AI agent to 'analyze' this data to 'discover patterns' or 'identify problems'.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via save_config and save_logs methods in scripts/skill_manager.py.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat stored data as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The AI agent is directed to use this data for reasoning and decision-making (analysis/optimization), providing a pathway for malicious content to influence agent behavior.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the ingested content.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The skill implementation lacks isolation or access control. It provides a global, shared JSON database where any skill can access any other skill's data by name.
  • Exposure: The get_all(), get_config(), and list_skills() methods in scripts/skill_manager.py allow any caller to retrieve data belonging to any other skill. This would lead to the exposure of sensitive configurations or credentials if stored by other skills.
  • Integrity: Any skill can overwrite or delete another skill's data using save_config() or delete(), as there is no verification of the caller's identity.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 12:34 AM