deepagents-implementation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The patterns describe agents that ingest untrusted data from the web (
web_search) and files (read_file) while possessing the capability to execute shell commands (execute) and modify files (write_file,edit_file). Evidence: 1. Ingestion points:web_searchin patterns.md andread_filein tools.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent in system prompts. 3. Capability inventory:execute,write_file,edit_file, andtaskin tools.md. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is mentioned. - [Command Execution] (HIGH): The
executetool explicitly enables shell command execution. TheFilesystemBackendexample in patterns.md points to a local user directory (/Users/dev/project), which could lead to host compromise if the agent is manipulated via prompt injection. - [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): The filesystem tools (
ls,read_file,grep) allow access to absolute paths. Without strict sandboxing or path validation beyond the root_dir, this creates a risk of exposing sensitive system files or credentials if the agent is misconfigured.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata