fetch-pr-feedback

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from GitHub PR comments and passing it to the receive-feedback skill for evaluation and execution.
  • Ingestion points: Comments are retrieved from the GitHub API in Step 3 of SKILL.md (repos/$OWNER/$REPO/issues/$PR_NUMBER/comments and repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls/$PR_NUMBER/comments).
  • Boundary markers: The skill organizes data using Markdown headers (e.g., ## Reviewer: ...), but lacks explicit instructions to the subsequent skill to ignore embedded commands or system instructions within the comment bodies.
  • Capability inventory: The ingested data is passed to beagle-core:receive-feedback, which is described as having the capability to 'verify -> evaluate -> execute' instructions derived from the feedback.
  • Sanitization: The skill performs regex-based cleaning (clean_body in the jq filters) to remove bot-specific metadata and boilerplate, but this does not sanitize the text against natural language prompt injection attacks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates jq script files at runtime and executes them to process data.
  • Evidence: In Step 3, the skill uses shell redirection (cat > /tmp/issue_comments.jq) to write complex filtering logic to temporary files, which are then executed using the jq -f flag.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the GitHub CLI (gh) to perform repository operations and fetch authenticated user data.
  • Evidence: Multiple calls to gh pr view, gh repo view, gh api user, and gh api --paginate are used to populate environmental variables and retrieve external content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 3, 2026, 04:16 AM