skills/eyadsibai/ltk/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill instructs the user to install @openai/codex via npm. OpenAI's official library is 'openai'; there is no verified '@openai/codex' package, making this a high risk for supply chain attacks or typosquatting.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The core functionality revolves around codex exec, which executes AI-generated code. The skill explicitly encourages 'Autonomous' operation ('Complete tasks without seeking approval for each step'), creating a massive RCE surface if the agent is given untrusted inputs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill promotes use of the -s danger-full-access and --full-auto flags, which grant the CLI network access, system-level permissions, and file modification rights without human-in-the-loop verification.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The 'Execution Principles' section contains behavioral overrides, instructing the agent to be 'Autonomous' and 'Complete tasks without seeking approval,' which bypasses standard safety guardrails for tool usage.
  • [INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION] (HIGH): Mandatory Evidence Chain:
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted task descriptions are passed directly to codex exec (e.g., 'implement user auth').
  • Boundary markers: None. Data is interpolated directly into the execution command.
  • Capability inventory: Full workspace write, network access, and system-level access (danger-full-access).
  • Sanitization: None. The skill relies on the AI to generate 'minimal' code but provides no validation mechanisms.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:15 AM