skills/eyadsibai/ltk/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external PDF files, creating a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: PDF data is loaded via pypdf in extract_form_field_info.py, fill_fillable_fields.py, and fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.py, as well as pdfplumber in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when the agent processes the extracted text or form data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write and modify files (PdfWriter.write) and perform complex operations based on PDF contents.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization for the text or metadata extracted from PDFs before it is presented to the agent context.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The file scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py implements a monkeypatching technique to override DictionaryObject.get_inherited in the pypdf library at runtime. While this is used to address a specific library bug, dynamic modification of imported libraries is a risky practice that can lead to unexpected behavior or be exploited if the patching logic is compromised.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The SKILL.md file documentation encourages the use of system-level command-line tools such as qpdf, pdftk, and pdftotext, which increases the agent's operational footprint and reliance on the host environment's shell capabilities.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:10 AM