droid-control

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 21, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses sudo apt-get to install system packages such as cage, wtype, ffmpeg, and grim, which allows for privilege escalation to root to modify the system environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamically constructs and executes shell commands for terminal automation, including the use of absolute file paths and session management in global temporary directories (/tmp/tctl-sessions/).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs multiple external dependencies from npm (tuistory), pip (asciinema), and cargo. Specifically, it downloads and compiles the agg tool directly from a remote GitHub repository using cargo install --git.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Operates as an automation driver that processes output from external applications (TUIs and web apps) to determine its next actions. This architecture is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, as a malicious target application could produce output designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Terminal output via tuistory/tctl and web page content via agent-browser.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings for ignoring embedded instructions in external data are implemented.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive subprocess execution (tctl, bash, remotion), file system writes, and network-enabled browser automation.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not define sanitization or validation protocols for the data ingested from target applications.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 21, 2026, 08:32 AM