team-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a persistent memory system that processes session transcripts (which contain untrusted user input) to generate markdown memory blocks. These blocks are subsequently loaded into the system prompt of future sessions via @import directives.
- Ingestion points: transcripts are read from
~/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonlinreferences/agents/sleep-extract.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing or reloading memories.
- Capability inventory: The background agents use
WriteandBashtools to manage the memory filesystem and execute logic. - Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of transcript content is performed before it is committed to persistent storage.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple shell scripts are used for initialization and session management. The
init.shscript programmatically modifies the global~/.claude/settings.jsonfile to install a persistence hook. Additionally, thelaunch.shscript includes an--unsafeflag that, when used, bypasses standard permission prompts in the underlying agent CLI. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's architecture involves accessing and reading sensitive local data, specifically session transcripts and configuration files, to maintain its memory state. While no network exfiltration was detected, the scope of file system access is broad.
Audit Metadata