fal-audio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The scripts
scripts/speech-to-text.shandscripts/text-to-speech.shuse shell heredocs (cat <<EOF) to construct JSON payloads. Because these heredocs allow parameter expansion, any user-provided input (via--text,--audio-url, or--model) containing shell metacharacters like$(...)or backticks will be executed by the host shell during variable assignment. For example, setting--text "$(whoami)"would result in the commandwhoamirunning on the system. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (MEDIUM): The
--add-fal-keyfunctionality in both scripts writes theFAL_KEYto a.envfile in the skill's directory. Storing credentials in plain-text on the filesystem is a risk for data exposure if the agent environment is compromised or shared. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8c). It retrieves and transcribes content from external
audio-urlsources. If an attacker provides an audio file that transcribes into malicious instructions, the agent may follow those instructions in subsequent steps. - Ingestion points:
scripts/speech-to-text.sh(via--audio-urlargument) - Boundary markers: None detected in the prompt logic for the transcription output.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
curland manage local files (.env). - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the transcription text before it is returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata