k-mechanic
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest and process external content from World of Warcraft environment files and addon outputs.
- Ingestion points:
addon.output,sv.parse,sv.discover, andapi.search(defined incli-commands.md). These functions read data from external files and logs that can be influenced by third-party addon code. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided skill documentation or tool descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The
mech callinterface (documented incli-commands.md) allows execution of subprocesses for linting, testing, formatting, and git operations. Thelua.queueandsandbox.execcommands allow for code execution either in-game or in a local sandbox. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or instruction-stripping for data returned via
addon.outputorsv.parse. - [Command Execution] (HIGH): The
mechCLI tool, as described incli-commands.md, provides a direct bridge for the agent to execute shell commands. - Evidence: Commands like
mech call release.allchain multiple operations includinggit.commitandgit.tag. Other commands wrapluacheck,stylua, andbustedtests. If an agent is misled by injected instructions in the data it is processing, it could use these tools to perform unauthorized file modifications or code commits. - [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill provides capabilities to read arbitrary files via
system.pick_fileand parse WoW-specific data structures (sv.parse). While these are legitimate developer features, they provide the agent with access to potentially sensitive local configuration files if misdirected.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata