paper-archive
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands including
ls,mkdir, andmvto manage files within the user's~/Downloads, iCloud Drive, and Obsidian vault. These operations are necessary for the skill's purpose of archiving and renaming files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its handling of untrusted data from PDF files.
- Ingestion points: Metadata such as titles, abstracts, and author names are extracted from PDF files found in the
~/Downloadsdirectory using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the PDF text during extraction.
- Capability inventory: The extracted metadata is interpolated into shell commands for file renaming/moving and into Markdown templates for note creation. This includes the
mvcommand and file-writing operations. - Sanitization: While the skill lacks formal sanitization of the extracted text, it includes mitigation strategies such as requiring explicit user confirmation of proposed filenames/categories (Step 4) and a mandatory rule to quote all file paths to prevent basic shell command injection.
Audit Metadata